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DẼMOS 2 is a proposed e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable, meaning that its results
can be verified for correctness from end-to-end. This is clearly an important characteristic
of any e-voting system that aspires to widespread adoption, but it requires that voters and
third parties possess the means to perform such verifications. It is in this area that the
current DẼMOS 2 implementation is lacking, and this project is an attempt to rectify this
through the development of a mobile phone app. for Android devices. The design of such
an app. is here presented, but the implementation remains incomplete. Despite this, an
evaluation of the app. as it currently stands is presented, followed by a detailing of avenues
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This chapter contains an introduction and outline of the aims of the project.
1.1 Problem Specification
E-voting is becoming increasingly popular both as a addition to, and a replacement for, tra-
ditional voting methods, both at the lowest (e.g. club executive elections) and highest (e.g.
national elections) levels. In order to maintain trust in the electoral process, these systems
must be considered secure and the results they generate considered accurate. One way of
demonstrating this is to demonstrate the property of E2E verifiability in the system design,
which ensures that one can verify various properties about the election, such as that the bal-
lot sent to the election server contains the vote cast by the voter and has not been modified
en route. Providing interested parties the theoretical assurance that they can verify aspects
of the election is one thing; without the means to actually do so, any such system will remain
of interest only to the world of academia.
One such proposed E2E-verifiable system is the DẼMOS e-voting system, and the sub-
sequent DẼMOS 2 E2E-verifiable Internet voting (E2E-VIV) system. Whilst this system
design has been proven to be E2E-verifiable, there exists as yet no independent auditing
software to actually enable this verification in practice, nor even the functionality within the
current version of the system needed for such a piece of software. So that DẼMOS 2 can be-
gin to be adopted by regular, non-academic users, this gap must be filled. This dissertation
shall detail the attempt to fill this gap, through the development of a smartphone application
that will allow any interested party to verify that an election conducted via DẼMOS 2 has
been conducted fairly, whilst still maintaining the secrecy necessary to deter vote coercion
or selling.
1.2 Project Aims
The aims of this project are as follows:
• to add functionality to DẼMOS 2 to allow a voter to check that their vote has been
recorded-as-intended;
• to through adding functionality to DẼMOS 2 and the development of a separate Android
mobile application, allow a voter (or a third party to whom they have delegated the task)
to verify that their ballot has been cast-as-recorded;
1
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• to as before, allow a voter or third party to verify that the final calculated result of a
given election has counted-as-cast all given ballots;
• to ensure that these three features are implemented in such a way that ensures a
voter’s privacy is protected;
• to ensure that these three features are implemented in such as way as to deter voter
coercion, vote buying and vote selling; and
• to document the ways in which which these features are implemented so that future
developers are able to easily develop their own independent election auditing tools.
1.3 Overview
This dissertation is divided into 8 sections. Following the present introductory section is an
account of the historical development of voting, the recent rise of e-voting and a number of
real-world case studies. In the third section, the requirements of an election auditing app for
mobile are listed. In the fourth, the design of the app, including justifications of the attempts
made to address the aforementioned requirements, is presented. In the fifth, a report on
the technical implementation of the design are shown. In the sixth, the process of using
the app is detailed. In the seventh, the results of testing on the finished application are
demonstrated and the success of the project evaluated. Finally, the paper concludes with a





This section provides a background to the topic at hand. First, an analysis is made of
the difficulties of group decision-making and the solutions to the problem. In order to help
classify these solutions, a two-level taxonomic system is described. Following this, formal
definitions of the terms voting and election are given, with regard to these taxonomies. The
terms traditional voting, e-voting and I-voting are then defined, along with details of their
historical development and contemporary case studies of each. Finally, the DẼMOS 2 e-
voting system is described.
2.1 Group decision-making
Life is a constant process of decision-making and all organisms are constantly doing so,
be it consciously or unconsciously. The majority of these daily decisions leave little room
for debate—whether one shall eat some food is easily answered by whether one is currently
hungry—but there are times when the correct, or at least the least bad, decision not so clear.
This becomes more common whenever those organisms are tasked with making decisions
that affect more than just themselves—that is, decisions on the level of the group. For ex-
ample, questions like ‘should x lead us?’ or ‘should we fight with group z?’ affect multiple
lives and—when talking about human decision-making—the answers can have as much to
do with personal, individually-variate beliefs—about x’s character, for example, or about the
particular egregiousness of group z—than they do with factual observation. For groups to
function, therefore, various group decision-making processes have developed over the span
of evolutionary history.
Though the remainder of this chapter shall focus exclusively on group decision-making
within exclusively human groups—anthrocracies—but it is worth nothing that elements of the
following proposed taxonomies map equally onto the ‘government’ of non-human groups,
such as the lykocracy of a wolf pack. Within anthrocracies of a certain level of development,
these processes are often codified into systems of government. Note, however, that whilst
these terms are usually encountered in political discourse and reference the ‘state’, or any
group which maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory [104],
they are equally applicable to all groups—i.e., whenever two or more people operate as a
single unit. Whether one is talking about NATO, the UK, the Catholic Church, a university
society, a Masonic lodge or a family of six or a couple of newlyweds, all have the necessity
of group decision-making in common.
3
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m = 0 acracy
m = 1 monocracy
1 < m < n
2 oligocracy
m = n/2 hemicracy
n
2
< m < n polycracy
m = n pantocracy
Figure 2.1: The Kratic Scale
2.2 A taxonomy of group decision-making processes
One must ask two questions of a group’s decision-making processes in order to classify
them. The questions are:
• what proportion of those people take part in the decision-making? and
• how are those who take part distinguished from those who do not?
Both of these questions shall be dealt with in turn, but both necessitate that we first distin-
guish between direct and indirect participation in group decision-making. Direct participation
is here defined as any act which has a completely- or partially-binding effect on the group’s
decision. For example, as we shall see later, casting a vote that will be added to a tally for a
particular course of action, where the resulting most-popular course will be undertaken, is an
example of direct participation. Indirect participation is any act which has a non-binding ef-
fect. For example, advising the direct decision-makers or spreading awareness about one’s
preferred course of action.
2.2.1 The Kratic Scale
The first dimension along which one may categorise a group’s decision-making processes
is that of division. Where a group may consists of n members (n ≥ 2), what proportion m of
n directly participate in group decision-making? The values of m can be plotted on a [0 − n]
scale (see fig. 2.1).1 Alternatively, each possibility can be described as such:
• acracy, wherein none of the population make decisions for others;
• monocracy, wherein one of a population makes decisions for the whole;
• oligocracy, wherein a minority subset of the population makes decisions for the whole;
• hemicracy, wherein one half of the population makes decisions for both;
• polycracy, wherein a majority subset of the population makes decisions for the whole;
• pantocracy, wherein the entire population makes decisions for itself.
1In the interests of specificity and consistency, I have chosen to replace the more common terms ‘anarchy’
and ‘oligarchy’ with their ‘-cracy’ forms.
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‘True’ pantocracy
. . . Melisso- Lyko- . . .
Our new root
. . . . . .
. . . Eleuthero- Gyno- . . .






Figure 2.2: A Kratic Tree, with a path taken to describe a group in which direct decision-
making power rests with free men (a polyeleuthero-hemiandrocracy )
This taxonomy is not perfect. Even putting aside acracy, which draws into question whether
the resulting ‘group’ is any longer even that, things in reality are never so neatly-defined.
None of these terms bring into account how much each member’s participation is worth,
relative to one another—i.e., if everyone in the population directly participates in group
decision-making, but one minority subset’s votes are counted twice, is that an oligocracy
or a pantocracy? As the closest approximation of a true pantocracy might be something on
level of an entire natural ecosystem, the human capacity for outsized environmental impact
raises this very question.
2.2.2 Kratic Trees
Having specified the proportion of a group’s population that participate directly in decision-
making, we may now describe the basis by which those participants are selected. Rather
than a scale, this element of the taxonomy takes the form of a tree, as seen in fig. 2.2. At
the root node is the ‘true’ pantocracy of the ecosystem. Each branch consists of a different
quality by which decision-making participants are distinguished from non-participants. For
example, we have previously stated that we are here interested only in a study of human
groups. Thus we first specify the oligoanthrocracy within the pantocracy as our scope of
study. In addition, many human groups divide all those people impacted by the group’s
decisions—i.e., all of its stakeholders—into either the polis or not (e.g., dividing people living
with the UK into ‘citizens’ or ‘non-citizens’). Thus, we are now referring to a polypolitocracy
(assuming that the polis represents the majority) within this broader oligoanthrocracy, and
we may say that in the territory of the United Kingdom we have:
• the ‘true’ pantocracy of all stakeholders present (i.e., the ecosystem); which includes
5
Chapter 2 Section 2.3
• the oligoanthrocracy of all humans present (e.g., UK citizens, EU citizens, stateless
persons, etc.); which includes
• the polypolitocracy of all UK citizens.
Say we want to discuss a nation in which a minority make decisions for the whole on
the basis of their wealth. Starting from the root of the tree, this would produce the rather
unwieldy ‘oligopluto-polypolito-oligoangthrocracy’. Clearly, it is better that we identify in ad-
vance a node on the tree to serve as the root within our scope, and then elide the preceding
terms, as we have done here by declaring our root to the polypolito-oligoanthrocracy node.
If we later wished to contrast a given anthrocracy with a melissocracy of bees [87], for ex-
ample, it would be necessary to move our root one node up, to the species distinction level.
The subset of the polis that are allowed to directly participate in group decision-making
varies still further. For the present taxonomy, we shall abandon common but not-particularly-
informative terms such as ‘democracy’. Classical Athenian ‘democracy’, for example, al-
lowed only male citizens over 30 years old to run for office, making it under this more precise
taxonomy an oligo-geronto-androcracy, or rule of the few on the basis of their being suffi-
ciently old and male. Even a modern ‘democracy’ like the UK restricts certain citizens—e.g.,
those in prison or under 18 years old—from participating directly [108], and is thus some-
thing of a poly-eleuthero-gerontocracy—rule of most, on the basis of their being sufficiently
old and free. For the purpose of brevity, the term ‘democracy’ shall be used in the place of
this last term for the remainder of this work.
Most historical societies have aligned primarily with either the monocratic or oligocratic
ideal. Monocracy has traditionally been supplemented with some sort of theological basis for
the monocrat’s superiority, as in the idea of absolute monarchy and the ‘divine right of kings’,
paired with a patrilineal descent—thus, a monotheopatricracy, or rule of one on the basis of
God and their father. An oligocracy will similarly justify the superiority of its decision-making
class, whether on the grounds of: their wealth (as in a plutocracy); their wisdom (as in an
noocracy); their talent or ability (as in a meritocracy); or any number of other properties, both
quantifiable or otherwise.
Democracy relies on the idea that by allowing all members of the population an equal
say in the group’s decisions, even someone whose preferred choice of action is not the most
popular is nonetheless satisfied that the decision thus chosen has been chosen fairly, and
will submit to it in the hopes that if the situation is later reversed and their preferred course
of action turns out to be the most popular, the supporters of the less-popular choices will
similarly accept the result. This is best encapsulated in the Enlightenment-era idea of the
social contract, by which governments derive their right to exist from the consent of the
governed. However, even in many democracies the distinction is unclear. In representative
democracy, for example, all (or almost all) of the members have a say in the election of a
group of people to whom the actual decision-making powers fall. In this case, representative
democracy is more accurately described as democratically-elected oligocracy.
2.3 How each group type makes group decisions
Having described the different systems of government in terms of how they distribute partic-
ipation in group decision-making amongst their membership, we shall now look at different
6
Chapter 2 Section 2.4
means by which theses decisions are then made. Again, acracy shall be left aside.
In an monocracy, the monocrat makes group decisions the same way they would individ-
ual ones—they choose their preferred course of action, and that is the course of action that
is followed. In a true monocracy there is nobody to provide input on the decision-making,
so there is no debate except that internally within the monocrat. In real monocracies, such
as many monarchies, the monocrat is given a team of advisers who can attempt to sway
them towards one course of action or another, but who ultimately do not have a direct impact
on the decision chosen—they are the monocratic equivalent of the powerless majority in an
oligocracy.
Despite differing in who they allow to take part in the group decision-making, all non-
monocratic types of group use the same means of determining the group’s course of action.
At its simplest, this is simply choosing at random from the available options, such as the
sortition system of ancient Athenian democracy or, contemporarily, selection for jury service
in the US and UK. Generally, however, groups assume (not necessarily correctly; see [77])
that reasoned-about and consciously-selected choices will generally produce more positive
outcomes than random ones. As such, non-autocratic group decision-making methods in-
volve around letting decision-makers indicate their preference(s) on a range of courses of
action, recording those preferences and then determining which course of action to follow
from this information.
Voting is the term for this preference-indicating.2 In voting each participant, or ‘voter’, in-
dicates their choice(s) of preference out of a number of discrete options—the ancient Greeks
used pottery shards to record choices, most contemporary elections use paper ballots and
smaller groups may make do with raised hands—and the winner is that option or those op-
tions that achieve some predetermined criteria, such as having received the greatest number
of votes after a specified end date for the election. The whole process is called an ‘election’,
and there are different ways of handling the results thus generated. Winner-takes-all means
that the winning choice is enacted as it was proposed, regardless of how small a major-
ity it may have garnered or how detrimental to the minority it may be. Consensus-based
decision-making, on the other hand, requires the minority of voters to nonetheless consent
to the course of action favoured by the majority before it may be enacted, and subsequently
that the supporters of such a course of action must negotiate with those of the opposed
minority in order to produce a compromise that all can accept.
How many cycles are taken before reaching the final result can also differ. The Delphi
method, for example, invites the participants to anonymously present their judgements on
the matter at hand to one another. They are then invited to revise their judgements in light
of hearing others’ arguments. This process repeats until a predetermined stopping point is
reached, such as a set number of cycles having elapsed or a certain threshold of experts
concurring with one another [25]. The privacy of one’s choice(s) of preference also varies,
from the use of secret ballots with no link back to the voter who cast them to voting via public
announcement in favour of a given course, as does their mutability.
2Note that voting has been observed in a number of non-human species; see [58, 22, 87].
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2.4 A brief history of voting
Voting has likely existed in some form or another for as long as human groups have had
to make decisions on matters that may divide them, but democratic society is traditionally
assumed to have begun with the reforms of Solon in Athens, between the 7th and 6th cen-
turies B.C. (this traditional assumption has, however, been challenged by recent scholarship
claiming evidence of the emergence of similar systems outside of the ‘West’ around a similar
time period [65]). Nowadays, democracy is in vogue at the nation state-level—the majority
operate systems that are (to some degree) democratic [114], and the US Department of
State can be assumed to speak for all of the democratic world when it states its belief that
‘[d]emocratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression,
expand open markets, promote economic development, protect [our] citizens, combat inter-
national terrorism and crime, uphold human and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises
and refugee flows, improve the global environment, and protect human health.’ [100]
Unlike most other aspects of society, the means of conducting an election have remained
largely unchanged in the face of technological advancements over the centuries. Modern
national elections continue to use paper ballots for recording of voter preferences, which are
then counted by hand—methods that would be just as familiar to ancient Athenians with their
shards of pottery as they are to us. Despite this, one characteristic of most contemporary
voting systems would appear utterly alien to an early mindset: who is granted the vote. The
expansion of suffrage, or voting rights, to greater and greater numbers of people is the only
way in which voting has substantively changed over thousands of years.
2.4.1 An example election: UK general election 2015
In this section, we shall examine how a traditional election is generally run. We shall use the
2015 UK general election as our example [35].
Prior to the election day, all eligible voters (i.e. those who have previously registered for
the electoral roll) are mailed a poll card detailing what the election is for, as well as when
and where they are to cast their votes. On the day itself, they arrive at their allocated polling
station and announce their name to the polling clerk, who strike them off of a list of eligible
voters for the area. They then proceed to take their ballot paper to a private or semi-private
voting station, where they place a cross next to the candidate of their choice. Finally, they
fold the ballot paper in two and deposit it in a ballot box, before leaving the polling station.
Some voters may instead submit postal ballots, the process for which shall not be detailed
here.
The ballot boxes are then transported in vans to the count, which is presided over by an
entirely ceremonial Returning Officer (RO)—usually the county high sheriff, mayor or coun-
cil chairman—and the non-ceremonial Acting Returning Officer (ARO)—usually a senior
local authority officer—who is ultimately ‘...legally and potentially financially responsible for
screw-ups by any election staff.’ Also present are the teams of counters, ‘...election agents,
protecting the interests of their candidate...’ and impartial, accredited observers, who are
expected to report any suspicions they have about the fairness of how the count is being
conducted to the election officials.
First, the ballot boxes are unsealed, the ballots removed and the boxes shown to all
present to be genuinely empty. All of the ballot papers are then counted, and the totals
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compared to the ballot paper account provided by the Presiding Officer of each ballot sta-
tion. If there is a mismatch, they are recounted until they match or until the same number is
recorded twice in a row. The ballot papers are then mixed and allocated to teams of coun-
ters, who sort them into piles based on which candidate they display a vote for. Unclear
ballots are deferred to the ARO or their deputy to make a decision on. After all of the ballot
papers have been sorted, each candidate’s votes (and any rejected votes) are again counted
and compared to the total expected number of ballot papers.
The ARO shares the results with the candidates and their agents, who may request a
recount if they consider it necessary. There are no limits on the number of recounts that can
be held, but it is the ARO’s decision to allow or deny a request. If the final result is a tie,
the ARO may decide the winner via any method that all candidates approve, such as a coin
toss.
2.5 Advantages and limitations of traditional voting
Traditional voting refers to those methods of running an election which have existed in some
form or another for centuries, such as the aforementioned pottery shards, paper ballots and
raised hands. The paper ballot system, whilst certainly labour intensive, is reliably robust
and technologically immune to cyber-subterfuge. There are some fundamental limitations,
however. Some are unique to certain countries’ systems. For example, the UK, Singapore
and a handful of others print unique serial numbers on each ballot paper as a means to
combat fraud, with the trade-off of making each ballot potentially traceable to the voter who
cast it [40], and there are allegations that British intelligence agencies may have used these
methods to identify those voting for the Communist Party of Great Britain during the 1960s
and ’70s [112, 106]. The only protection against such an attack—besides the prohibitive
amount of time and effort it would take when many contemporary voters seem happy to dis-
play their votes on social media [98, 10]—is that it is illegal to do so (or, more cynically, to be
caught doing so). Additionally, the lack of a photographic ID requirement in UK polling sta-
tions theoretically allows any person who knows another’s registered polling station to vote
in their stead—one could use another’s vote for a party contrary to their own preference, or
use a person one knows to be unlikely to vote themselves as a means to increase one’s own
voting power, via an additional vote for their own candidate of choice.
Other limitations are inherent in the technology, or lack thereof, used. Paper-based and
postal ballots, for example, ‘...don’t allow voters to confirm their votes were actually counted.’
[82] This means that the system demands that a voter trust the election officials to carry out
a fair count. In addition, the present system requires that a voter physically show up at a
polling station. This may deter those members of the electorate who would struggle to make
their way to a local polling station, such as the disabled or expatriates, from participating. In
addition, the impact of bad weather on voter turnout continues to be debated [76, 9, 48, 72,
52, 30, 6]. These restrictions may, in part, explain the 10% drop in global voter turnout over
the last 25 years [113] (along with an over 20% drop in British voter turnout since 1950 [29]).
Whilst postal votes and voting-by-proxy have been introduced to remedy these issues, they
bring with them unique vulnerabilities of their own. Finally, the only element of the British
election in which IT is utilised—the management of the electoral registers—has proven to
be less-than-reliable, with mismanaged registers leading to voters being turned away from
their polling stations [34, 102, 47]. During one mayoral election in 2016, ‘[o]ne station said
that of the first 30 voters to show up, only three were on the register.’ [47]
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2.6 E-voting
One proposed solution to these limitations is the introduction of E-voting, either as an alter-
native to traditional voting or (more often) as a supplementary option. E-voting, as contrasted
with traditional voting, is the introduction of any electromechanical machinery to the electoral
process, be it in the casting of votes or simply the tabulation of results. The term encom-
passes ‘...systems such as DRE voting machines, ballot scanners, digital pens and internet
voting systems.’ [23]
An e-voting system can be classified as either a Paper-Based Electronic Voting System,
where a paper ballot is produced by or marked using electronic means, or a Voting Sys-
tem, where no paper ballot is involved and the ballot is entirely electronic. Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) voting systems can be classified as either on-site or remote. In the former
case, whatever electronic systems are used are used within the confines of an official polling
station, under supervision. In the latter, votes may be cast remotely. This is usually over the
Internet, and such a system is called an Internet voting (I-voting) system.
The Council of Europe has identified eight conditions which any e-voting system must





5. regulatory and organisational requirements;
6. transparency and observation;
7. accountability; and
8. reliability and security of the system [24].
There are a number of possible advantages to introducing e-voting (either as the sole
or a supplementary means of voting) that have been argued for. One is the hope that
by making voting something that can be done from home, perhaps with a simple app on
the mobile phone already in the potential voter’s pocket, it may better fit in to a changing
contemporary culture of civic participation and help to reverse the trends of declining voter
turnout, particularly amongst young voters. The evidence for this, however, is by no means
conclusive—whilst one report claimed that the introduction of e-voting in the UK could in-
crease 18–24-year-old turnout by up to 70%, and overall turnout by up to 79% [105], a
working group appointed by the Finnish Ministry of Justice to review their own e-voting pi-
lot concluded that ‘...enabling online voting would probably not increase voting turnout in
any significant manner’ [33]. Other research has found that whilst there was no significant
general increase in voter turnout [13, 109], and that the middle-aged voter turnout actually
increased more than the youth turnout [13].
Through the use of cryptography, ballots can be made physically unreadable for any
unauthorised party, providing a stronger defence than a mere legal one. Additionally, the
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anonymity of voters may be better preserved trough the use of cryptographic means. Most
promisingly, these additional layers of verifiability make it possible to create a system in
which any part can be verified at any time, by any party, provided they have the technical
means to do so. E-voting can also be implemented in such a way as to allow for a voter to
change their vote at any time before the end of the election, as Estonia’s system does [82],
which may serve to help voters to make more informed decisions about their preferences
over a longer period of time than the single day of voting that is typical of UK elections, as
well as making vote buying unappealing (as voters can no longer be trusted not to change
their vote after pocketing their fee).
Another argument often made in favour of e-voting is the proposed reduction in cost,
with one report claiming that switching over to an e-voting system could save the UK £12.8
million annually [105]. This would, of course, only be the case if a government were to take
the radical step of running an election solely using e-voting—otherwise, there would be an
additional cost of running an e-voting system alongside the traditional means, no matter how
small it may be. Finally, e-voting may allow expatriates to easily participate in elections in
their home country, although as the means to enable this already exist without the introduc-
tion of e-voting, objections to doing so are likely to be more political than technical.
2.7 E2E-verifiability
Traditionally, the security of voting systems has been assessed as a result of the assessed
security of each part of the process by which elections are undertaken in the system. How-
ever, this granular level of security assessment can be less than ideal, leading to the ignoring
of some vulnerabilities and the overcorrection of others. The alternative is for a system to
be E2E-verifiable, in which the security of the entire chain is assessed holistically. In ad-
dition, ‘[s]ecurity experts advise that end-to-end verifability—lacking in current systems—is
one of the critical features needed to guarantee the integrity, openness, and transparency of
[I-voting] election systems.’ [27]
E-voting systems that are considered to be E2E-verifiable when the following integrity
properties are satisfied for each vote cast:
1. recorded-as-intended, i.e. the vote made accurately reflects the intention of the voter;
2. cast-as-recorded, i.e. the ballot cast accurately reflects the recorded vote; and
3. counted-as-cast, i.e. the eventual election tally includes all cast ballots in the totals for
their respective candidates. [83]
Each of these steps must be verifiable, but the parties that can verify each step varies. In
the case of recorded-as-intended, for example, ‘[o]nly [the] voter knows [their] intentions,
and these should be kept private, so only [they] can verify the record of their vote’. On the
other hand, satisfying cast-as-recorded verifiability necessitates that the ‘[c]ollection of cast
ballots needs to be public, and cast ballots need to be identifiable, so [a] voter can find [their]
ballot and check that it is correctly included [emphasis theirs]’ in the collection, but in such a
way that a voter is unable to sell their vote to an interested other party, such as through the
encryption of ballots and the issuing of the resultant ciphertexts as receipts. Finally, despite
this ballot encryption, a number of approaches exist to allow any party to verify counted-as-
cast for the final election result.
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One of the earliest proposals for an E2E-verifiable began with a lamentation that ‘[c]urrent
electronic voting machines at polling places don’t give receipts [and that, r]ather, they require
prospective voters to trust them—without proof or confirming evidence—to correctly record
each vote and include it in the final tally’ [16], going on to introduce a system that could
provide a ‘...a fundamentally new kind of receipt’ based on visual cryptography. In this case,
the visual cryptography involved the use of translucent printed ballots that must be overlaid
in order to reveal the complete receipt. This was followed in short order by a proliferation
of E2E-verifiable systems such as Punchscan [18], Prêt à Voter [85], Scratch & Vote [2],
Scratch, Click & Vote [55], ThreeBallot [84], all of which rely on paper ballots of varying
degrees of complexity. Scantegrity distinguished itself by proposing an add-on for existing
optical scan voting systems, rather than a replacement for the system itself [17]; STAR-
Vote was intended to do something similar a few years later when it was introduced in Travis
County, Texas, in the hopes of prompting a shift ‘...away from the old model, in which counties
principally buy unique hardware from vendors...[towards one that is] county-owned and -
operated, relying on open-source software that can be shared across jurisdictions and only
requires equipment that can be bought commercially off the shelf, like tablets and scanners.’
[11, 74] However, the STAR-Vote project was ultimately unsuccessful [80].
2.8 E-voting in practice
E-voting and I-voting have been trialled or implemented, whether for select populations or
nationwide, in a number of countries, as varying levels within each, and to varying degrees
of success and longetivity (see table 2.1, although bear in mind that ‘e-voting’ encompasses
quite a range of systems and thus direct comparisons between just what it is that each coun-
try has implemented under that name are difficult to make). In this section, a brief summary
of the experience of each country that has experimented with such measures shall be given.
The countries are here listed in alphabetical order.
Australia
Australia trialled e-voting for vision-impaired voters in their 2007 federal election, which later
‘...evolved into the current method of telephone voting for this group of voters’. Electronically-
certified lists were first introduced for the 2013 federal election and have continued in use
since; ballot paper scanning and voter preference recording were also performed with elec-
tronic means in their 2016 federal election [60]. At the state level, the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) first introduced e-voting options for their 2001 elections, with the technol-
ogy ‘...applied to both the casting and counting of votes.’ By the 2008 ACT elections, 1 in
5 voters’ votes were in some way electronically-processed. Victoria and Western Australia
have introduced some e-voting measures, Tasmania and South Australia use e-voting solely
for logistical purposes and Queensland and the Northern Territory have no implemented no
e-voting measures, with no plans to do so in the future [42].
Australia trialled I-voting for Australia Defence Force personnel deployed overseas in their
2007 federal elections. The trial cost amounted to $1,159 per I-voter, compared to a cost
of $8.86 per traditional voter, and the trial was thus discontinued on a cost basis [49]. The
Parliament of Australia Web site declares that, ‘[o]verall, the Australian states and territories
have not embraced electronic voting to any great degree’, although New South Wales has
allowed certain voters to vote over the Internet in state-level elections since 2011 [42, 60].
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Country E-voting introduced Ongoing? I-voting introduced Ongoing?
Australia 2007 Yes 2007 No
Belgium 1991 Yes
Brazil 1996 Yes









The Netherlands 1966 No
Norway 2003 No 2011 No
The Philippines 2010 Yes
Romania 2003 Yes
South Korea 2012 Yes
Switzerland 2009 Yes
United Arab Emirates 2011 Yes
United Kingdom 2000 No
United States3 1964 Yes 1997 Yes
Venezuela 1998 Yes
Table 2.1: The introduction of e-voting and I-voting by country. For countries operating
federal systems of government, only details of federal adoption are given.
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Belgium
Belgium introduced e-voting experimentally in 1991. Coverage was extended to 22% of the
population in 1994 and to 44% in 1999, a level at which it has remained steady since [26].
Brazil
Brazil introduced e-voting in 1996 and, since 2000, has conducted all elections entirely elec-
tronically [21].
Canada
E-voting has been used in some municipal elections in Canada since 1988 [20], and I-voting
since 2003 [39]. E- and I-voting are not used at the provincial or federal levels.
Estonia
As part of its E-Estonia scheme, Estonia became the first country in the world to host a
legally-binding general election using I-voting in their 2005 local elections, and the first to
allow I-voting in a national election in their 2007 election [15]. By the 2015 parliamentary
elections, 30.5% of participants cast their votes over the Internet [101].
Finland
Finland piloted I-voting in three municipalities in 2008. A working group was set up in 2017
to assess the feasibility of introducing nationwide I-voting, only to conclude that the risks
outweighed the benefits [33].
France
France had allowed French citizens living abroad to vote in Assembly of French Citizens
Abroad elections over the Internet since 2003 [46]. This was rescinded in 2017 due to
cybersecurity concerns [96].
Germany
Germany introduced e-voting for their 2005 Bundestag elections. Plans to extend the system
were cancelled in 2009 after the Federal Constitutional Court ruled e-voting unconstitutional
[70].
India
India introduced e-voting in 1982 on an experimental basis, although the election was sub-
sequently struck down by the Supreme Court of India [94]. After amendments were made to
the relevant legislation, all state elections and by-elections used e-voting in 2003. In 2011,
Gujarat state became the first to experiment with I-voting [90].
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Ireland
Ireland bought a number of e-voting machines to be piloted in their 2003 general election.
The machines were unpopular and mothballed, until Taoiseach Brian Cowen announced in
2010 that the machines were to be disposed of, with the overall cost of the project amounting
to over e54 million [73].
Italy
A handful of municipalities in Italy trialled partial e-voting in 2006, before the experiment was
halted over tampering concerns by the then-Prime Minister. Another attempt was made in
2008 that ran a paper ballot system alongside an e-voting system in order to allow the result
to be verified, and in 2013 an all-e-voting system was introduced for the first time [81].
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan introduced e-voting as an option for their 2004 Parliamentary elections and re-
tained the system for their 2005 and 2007 elections [50], before abandoning it for subse-
quent elections on the grounds that ‘...the system turned out to be unpopular among vot-
ers...political parties still do not trust it...[and] significant funds are required to update this
system and make it work’ [86].
Lithuania
Lithuania has a target for 20% of votes to be cast via I-voting by 2020, but there does not
appear to be as yet any means to do so [59].
Namibia
Namibia became the first African nation to introduce e-voting in 2014, despite ‘...an 11th-
hour court challenge to stop the vote from going ahead, saying the use of the Indian-made
e-voting machines could facilitate vote rigging.’ [68]
The Netherlands
The Netherlands used e-voting until 2007, when security concerns raised by the pressure
group Wij Vertrouwen Stemcomputers Niet (‘We Do Not Trust Voting Machines’) led to the
machines’ withdrawal [57, 110].
Norway
Norway carried out limited e-voting pilots in 2003. ‘Experiments with [I-voting] were carried
out during elections held in 2011 and 2013’ [28], but these were unsuccessful in increasing
voter turnout. This, combined with security concerns, led to the dissolution of the trials in
2014 [99].
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The Philippines
The Philippines invested $160 million into e-voting in 2010. Despite issues discovered with
the machines during pre-tests that necessitated their recall and reissuing nationwide [79], as
well as the placing of 250,000 troops on high alert during the election in order to quell violent
protests against the system [61], the Phillipines held its first e-voting-facilitated presidential
election that year [62].
Romania
Romania trialled e-voting for military personnel deployed overseas in 2003 [93] and pledged
for their 2016 local elections that ‘[t]here will not be even one polling station that does not
have an electronic contact device’ [31].
South Korea
South Korea introduced electronic means of vote-counting in 2012, and the resulting system
has been praised as ‘best practice’ [63].
Switzerland
Switzerland becam I-voting trials in 2009, opening the option up to all Swiss expatriates in
2014.
The United Arab Emirates
E-voting was introduced for the 2011 Federal National Council elections in order to encour-
age participation amongst an electorate unfamiliar with elections.
The United Kingdom
The first e-voting pilot in the UK took place in 2000, limited to vote-counting technology. De-
spite the Digital Democracy Commission’s 2015 report stating that ‘[b]y 2020, secure online
voting should be an option for all voters’ [92], a 2016 government response stated that the
governmetn ‘...do not have any plans to introduce electronic voting for statutory elections,
either using electronic voting in polling booths or remotely via the internet.’ [75]
Despite errors in implementation producing as many as 150,000 unintentionally-spoilt
ballots after it’s introduction in 2007, Scotland has used e-voting in subsequent elections
without issue.
The United States of America
Electronic counting of ballots was first introduced in California in 1964, and the first DRE
machine in Illiois in 1974. This trend has continued despite a number of embarassing in-
cidents, such as the contested 2000 presidential election [fahrenheit911], turnouts of over
200% [36] and leaked elector details [67], and many states now use some form of electronic
assistance in their election-running (although specific figures do not appear available) [41].
32 states allow for I-voting by overseas military personnel and citizens via one or more
electronic means, in line with the requirements of the 2007 Military and Overseas Voter
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Empowerment Act. The first example of I-voting provision was Texas’s decision to allow
astronauts in orbit the ability to vote over email in 1997. In addition, four states allow I-voting
for non-overseas citizens, with Alaska giving the option to all registered voters.
Venezuela
E-voting was introduced for the 1998 presidential election.
2.9 DẼMOS 2
One further proposal for an E2E-verifiable e-voting system is DẼMOS. The system, which
can also be used for I-voting, aims to provide ‘end-to-end verifiable elections’ whilst, as
opposed to popular alternatives such as Helios [1], not relying on ‘...any additional setup
assumptions or access to a random oracle’ [54]. Subsequent to the original DẼMOS, two
variants exist. DẼMOS 2 was developed in order to address the scalability issues of the
original system design [53], whilst D-DẼMOS is a distributed version of the same system
[19].
The proofs presented in the original DẼMOS paper demonstrate that the system is E2E-
verifiable, and this property holds true for each subsequent iteration of the system. As a
reminder, this ‘...mandates that the voter can obtain a receipt at the end of the ballot casting
procedure that can allow her to verify that her vote was (i) cast as intended, (ii) recorded
as cast, and (iii) tallied as recorded.’ The receipts in any such E2E system must also be
delegatable, in that ‘...the voter may delegate the task of verifiability to any interested third
party...’. Finally, however, is the complication that ‘...it should be infeasible for the voter to
use her receipt as proof of the way she voted...’, the risks of encouraging vote selling/buying
being obvious.
Development on a usable implementation of the DẼMOS 2 system began in 2017 as a
project within the Django web app development framework [111]. Ownership of the code-
base was transferred in 2018 and the implementation was expanded to use Node.js and
Celery for the server-side processing [5].
Whilst this software implementation of the DẼMOS 2 system is for the most part entirely
functional, allowing the running of elections using the secure E2E-verifiable cryptographic
principles outlined in the original paper, one component is missing—the ability for a voter
or an interested third-party to independently audit a given election to ensure that the ballots
are being recorded-as-intended, cast-as-recorded and, ultimately, counted-as-cast. It is this




This chapter contains an overview of a typical e-voting system architecture, taken primar-
ily from the example of the Estonian model [56] with some adaptations for generalisability,
followed by an overview of the specific architecture of the DẼMOS 2 system.
3.1 E-voting
Participants in an e-voting election can act in one of four positions. These positions are:
• voter, responsible for the casting of votes using a Vote Support Device (VSD);
• tallier, responsible for computing final election results;
• auditor, responsible for verifying the correctness of each stage of the election; and
• trustee, responsible for securing the election using a Trustee Support Device (TSD).
The VSD and TSD can be any applicable device used by the voter or trustee, such as a
laptop, mobile phone application, etc. Each position can have any number of participants
perform it.
An e-voting system consists of four elements. These elements are:
• the Bulletin Board (BB);
• the Election Authority (EA);
• the Registration Authority (RA); and
• the I-ballot box.
The architecture of an e-voting system is shown fig. 3.1. When an election is being set
up by the system, the trustee(s) first share amongst themselves a secret s which is used in
order to generate a public-key cryptography keypair (PK, SK). The public key PK is pub-
lished to the election server, whilst the secret key SK is divided into n pieces, where n is the
number of trustees, using an (n, t)-threshold secret sharing scheme [88, 12]. Each trustee
is given one share of SK, and the complete SK can only be reconstructed when a sufficient
number of shares (the threshold t) are combined.
The BB for an election stores the candidate and voter lists. Once the election has been
set up, the system uses the contact details stored in the voter list to contact all eligible voters
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Figure 3.1: Typical e-voting system architecture
and provide them with a link through which they may vote. Following the link generates a
unique voter ID for the voter. Using their VSD, the voters choose their preferred choice(s)
from the candidate list. These ballots are encrypted with the election’s PK to produce the
ciphertext C. The voter sends C, along with the signature σ, to the BB.
The BB sends (C, σ) to the EA’s Vote Forwarding Server (VFS). The EA’s VFS, in turn,
passes the ballot to the RA, which adds a timestamp TS. This timestamp is used in schemes
that allow voters to change their votes to determine which votes to count and which to dis-
card. The RA returns (C, σ, TS) to the EA, which stores it in its Vote Storage System (VSS).
The EA then sends the ballot to the I-ballot box, which contains a mix-net. A mix-net
takes n inputs and, through a sufficiently complex series of operations to each so that the
process is not reversible, produces n ciphertext outputs. Whilst zero-knowledge proofs can
be presented in order to show the correctness of the outputs, but these are beyond the scope




is then sent back to the BB.
When the election has expired, the BB passes its ballots to the tallier, using the timestamp
to resolve priority conflicts where relevant. Given n ballots, the tallier computes Tally (C1, C2, . . . , Cn)
to determine the number of votes for each candidates, where Tally () is the function required
to tally votes based on the encryption scheme used. The result can then be shared through
whatever means are appropriate.
At any point during this process, the auditor can test the three properties required for
E2E-verifiability, as discussed in § 2.7, as well as the correctness of the tallier.
3.2 DẼMOS 2
3.2.1 Software Stack
The currently-existing DẼMOS 2 implementation [111, 5] runs as a web application, consist-
ing of three server-side elements:
• a Node.js web server [71];
• a Celery distributed task queue [91]; and
• a MySQL database [66]
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Figure 3.2: From recorded votes to cast ballots
The Node.js server serves a web app built using the Python-based Django Web frame-
work [95] in the Model-View-Template (MVT) pattern, using models stored in the MySQL
database.
Unencrypted ballots are never passed to the server, with encryption being performed
using client-side Javascript. The Milagro Crypto Javascript library is used for all crypto-
graphic tasks [64], CSV parsing is handled by the Papa Parse module [43] and jQuery is
used throughout [51]. Fig. 3.2 shows the path taken to submit a user’s ballot to the server.
3.2.2 Running an Election
When the server is running, the web app may be reached on port 8000. The user is
prompted to log in or register. Having done so, they may now set up an election. Along
with details of the start and finish times, the polls and their candidates, the user is also
prompted to upload a number of email addresses for trustees and voters.
Once completed (and after all entered details have been validated), the election is cre-
ated with a ‘Pending’ status. Emails are then sent to all addresses in the trustees list con-
taining a link to a page on the web app in which they are prompted to generate and save
a private key before submitting the corresponding public key to the server. Once enough
public keys have been returned, the election status is changed to ‘Prepared’.
Emails are now sent to all entered voters containing their unique voting links. If the elec-
tion start time has not yet passed, these links will display an error. Once the start time has
passed, the election status is changed to ‘Active’ and the links instead direct voters to their
voting page, where they are able to place their vote on each poll presented.
When all votes are recorded, two copies of the resulting ballot are generated. The user
is prompted to choose one ballot to submit to the server, and the other is discarded. A voter
is free to return at any time before the end of the election and change their votes, which will
necessitate the generation and submission of a new ballot.
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Once the election is complete the trustees are again emailed, this time with a link at
which they can submit their private keys. Onces a sufficient number of these keys have




All versions of DẼMOS are proven to be end-to-end verifiable. However, as yet no third-party
auditing software exists, without which any such verifiability remains purely academic. Thus,
there is a need for such a piece of software in order to allow any interested party to verify
the results of an election with ease. In this chapter, the design of such a piece of software,
in the form of an Android mobile application, is described.
4.1 Project Requirements
The requirements for this project can be divided into two groups: requirements for the
DẼMOS 2 software as currently exists; and requirements for the auditing app that must
be created. The key words ‘MUST’ and ‘MUST NOT’ in this document are to be interpreted
as described in RFC 2119 [14].
4.1.1 DẼMOS 2 Requirements
Modifications to the existing DẼMOS 2 system must be made so that:
1. voters MUST be presented with confirmation of their recorded vote in order to allow for
recorded-as-intended verification;
2. voters MUST be presented with a secure copy of their ballot in a format that can be
easily transferred to another device (such as a mobile smartphone);
3. options MUST be provided for the format of this data transfer in order to ensure that all
voters are able to transfer it regardless of the technology they possess;
4. voting information MUST NOT pass unencrypted to the server at any point;
5. voters MUST be able to check that their ballot exists on the server;
6. voters and third parties MUST be presented with a means of auditing ballots held on
the server in order to allow for both cast-as-recorded and tallied-as-cast verification;
and
7. voters and third parties MUST NOT be able to discern which option(s) a ballot contains
a vote for.
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4.1.2 App. Requirements
The application must be designed in such a way that:
1. voters MUST be able to receive data presented by the DẼMOS 2 system using their
mobile phone;
2. voters MUST be able to store secure copies of their ballots locally;
3. voters MUST be able to transfer their secure ballot copies to third parties;
4. voters and third parties MUST be able to compare their secure ballot copies with the
ballot copies stored on the server; and
5. voters and third parties MUST NOT be able to discern which option(s) a ballot contains
a vote for.
4.2 DẼMOS 2 Modifications
Req. 1 is easy to implement without breaching req. 4 by using client-side Javascript—during
the voting process, before the ballot is produced, a confirmatory window is presented to the
voter featuring the candidate(s) for whom they have voted.
There are a handful of options by which req. 2 could have been satisfied, but the use
of a Quick Response (QR) code—a matrix-based form of barcode—seemed the simplest.
83% of mobile smartphones in 2012 incorporated a camera [3], and it seems reasonable to
assume that this proportion is by now far higher, so the use of a QR code should also mostly
satisfy req. 3, although a simple text representation of the content of the QR code is also
presented alongside it in order to ensure that all users are able to transfer their data.
The original plan was for DẼMOS 2 to display a QR code containing the entire unselected
ballot. However, the ballots (which are JSON objects) are very lengthy due to the fact that
they contain cryptographic values—a standard QR code can only fit 3 KiB of data [qr]—and
so they had to be shortened via Base64-encoding. Even this produced very large values,
so in the final version the ballot is encrypted using symmetric encryption and the secret key
SK (over the original asymmetric encryption using the election’s public key PK, resulting in
Enc (Enc (ballot)PK)SK). A Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) tag is then
computed for this ballot and the whole thing sent to the server.
By presenting SK and the HMAC to the voter on the client side, and therefore never
sending them to the server, it can be ensured that the server cannot decrypt, and so read
or alter, the ballot, satisfying req. 4. The use of an HMAC ensures that the server cannot
replace the ballot with its own altered version, as the HMAC would then be different. Finally,
by giving the ballot a unique ID and passing that to the voter as well, the voter (or a third
party) can request the ballot from the server and decrypt the layer of symmetric encryption
using SK.
To fulfil req. 5, a ‘Find Ballot’ page was added to DẼMOS 2. This page takes a number
of values—the voter ID and poll ID—and two hashes. It uses the IDs to retrieve a matching
ballot from the server database (if found), hashes it and compares the hash to the two pro-
vided in order to check that the ballot on the server matches one of the two generated for the
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voter. MD5 hashes were chosen for the level of speed and security they provide compared
with alternatives such as SHA-1 [103].
For req. 6, a new ‘Audit’ page will be added to the DẼMOS 2 system. This page can be
passed the unique handles of two encrypted ballots in order to retrieve them from the server.
Alternatively, ballot record files can be uploaded using a file browser in order to bypass the
server, if need be. After validating the ballots’ HMACs, they can then be decrypted using
an AES secret key entered by the voter and compared in order to check for equality, without
showing any information about who the ballot contains a vote for.
The ability to compare arbitrary ballots might have made it possible for an adversary to
determine which option(s) a ballot contained a vote for by making ballots corresponding to
different votes and comparing them with genuine ballots until a match was found. How-
ever, req. 7 should be covered by the fact that all handled ballots remain encrypted with the
election’s PK.
4.3 Auditor App Design
As mentioned above, QR codes were chosen as the primary means of data transfer, thus
satisfying req. 1. As such, the app uses the mobile device’s camera in order to scan the code
and store the resulting ballot ID. By comparing the stored HMAC hash with that attached to
the downloaded ballot, it can be confirmed that the ballot has not been tampered with.
Android apps are divided into Activities, each of which represents a function of the app
and may or may not have a UI display associated with it. The main menu of the app., to
which it would initially load, should present options for whether the user is casting a vote,
and thus wishes to record their ballot information using the camera, or if they are auditing an
election instead.
Choosing the ‘cast a vote’ option, the user will be taken to an Activity in which they use
their mobile phone camera to scan a series of QR codes presented by DẼMOS 2, storing
the transferred data in a LBRF. Once the last QR code has been scanned, the voter will be
returned to the main menu.
Choosing instead to ‘audit an election’, the user will be asked if they wish to check that a
ballot exists on the server, compare two ballots or audit an election result. In the first case,
they will be presented with a file browser and asked to locate the LBRF that they wish to
use. Having done so, they will be taken to an Activity with a WebView—which acts similarly
to an HTML <iframe> element in that it embeds a web page within the app.—pointing to the
DẼMOS 2 ‘Find Ballot’ page mentioned previously, with the relevant details retrieved from
the LBRF submitted to the page as URL parameters. This would check that the hash of
the ballot submitted to the server matches one of the two presented to the voter at ballot
generation and display a message in the app. to say so.
When choosing to compare two ballots, the user will again be presented with a Web-
View featuring the DẼMOS 2 ‘Audit’ page. The user will be able to specify their two ballot
handles by either entering them manually, or by selecting two LBRFs using a file browser,
from which the handles can be extracted. The page will then retrieve both ballots, computer
their HMACs and prompt the user to enter their secret key. After decrypting both ballots, the
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Figure 4.1: From recorded votes to cast ballots, encrypted ballots and LBRFs
HMACs within can be compared to those just generated in order to detect any modifications.
Following this, the ballots can be compared for equality, and the result presented to the user.
For the election result auditing option, the user will be presented with a file browser and
asked to select a directory containing multiple LBRFs. After checking that all files contain
the same election ID, each ballot will be checked for presence on the server.
Use of WebViews makes it possible to to load the DẼMOS 2 pages mentioned previously
and to run their Javascript client-side on the device, which easily satisfies reqs 4 & 5. To
satisfy reqs 2 & 3, the LBRFs will be saved to the phone’s External Storage and so are ac-
cessible from outside of the app, such as by a file viewer or email application.
Finally, it was decided to develop the app for the Android Operating System (OS) for two
reasons. First, Android has by far the largest market share out of all mobile device OSes
at around 85% to iOS, which has the second-biggest share at around 15% [45]. Second,
Android development is free and requires no license, whereas iOS development requires
that one join the Apple Developer Program at a rate of $90 per year.
4.3.1 Local Ballot Record File (LBRF)
The LBRFs need to contain all the information required to identify ballots on the server and
validate their integrity. For the first condition, the LBRF will contain the voter ID, the event ID
for the election and the ID of the poll which the ballot contains votes for in order to retrieve
the submitted ballot later. In addition, the LBRF will contain the hashes of both ballot copies
generated client-side in order to later verify that one of them is present on the server. The
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LBRF will also contain the unique handle of the encrypted, unselected ballot sent to the
server in order to retrieve it later. Finally, the LBRF will contain the HMAC computed over
the encrypted ballot before it is sent to the server. This can later be compared with the
HMAC computed over the encrypted ballot retrieved from the server in order to verify that it




This chapter shall detail the implementation thusfar of the designed app., including mod-









Firstly, a table had to be added to the DẼMOS 2 database model to hold the AES-encrypted
ballots transferred via the server. This was added to the /allauthdemo/polls/models.py file:
class EncBallot(models.Model):




Modifications were required to the event voting page in order to provide the means for audit-
ing.
/allauthdemo/polls/views.py
The event_vote() method was amended to allow for the saving of the unselected, encrypted
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# Adds or replaces the encrypted un-submitted ballot to the database for






b = EncBallot(handle=handle_json, ballot=enc_ballot_json)
b.save()
/static/js/event_vote.js
The next step was to amend the static client-side voting page to present the voter with
their ballot hash, encrypted ballot handle and QR codes of each. This was added to the
/static/js/event_vote.js file. r had to be added to the encrypted ballot fragments in the
generateBallots() method for later use in ballot verification:







A showIDsQRCode() method was added, called after ballot generation, which displays the
voter ID, event ID and poll ID for a given ballot:
function showIDsQRCode(ballotA, ballotB, selectedOption) {
var voterID = window.location.search.slice(1).split(/=(.+)/)[1];
var eventID = window.location.href.split('/')[4];
var pollID = $('#poll-num').text();
// Display a QR code with ID details
var modalDialog = $('#modalDialog');
var title = modalDialog.find('.modal-title');
var body = modalDialog.find('.modal-body');
body.empty();
title.text('Step 0 of 3: Scan this');
let pleaseScanP = document.createElement('p');
pleaseScanP.innerHTML = "Please scan the following QR code from your
DEMOS 2 mobile application:";
let QRDiv = document.createElement('div');
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body.append(pleaseScanP);
body.append(QRDiv);










Following this, showHashQRCode() hashes the two generated ballots and presents the result
to the user in both text and QR code form:
function showHashQRCode(ballotA, ballotB, selectedOption) {
var ballots = new Array(ballotA, ballotB);
var ballotHashes = new Array(2);
// Hash both ballots and store
for (let i = 0; i <= 1; i++)
ballotHashes[i] =
SHA256Hash(stringtobytes(JSON.stringify(ballots[i])), true);
After the selection of a ballot to submit to the server, and after the choice has been con-
firmed by the voter, the sendBallotsToServer() method was modified. This method originally
only handled the submission of the selected ballot to the server and discarded the unse-




var eventID = window.location.href.split('/')[4];
var pollNum = $('#poll-num').text();
var ballotID = encodeURIComponent(btoa(JSON.stringify({voterID: voterID,
eventID: eventID, pollNum: pollNum})));
Then, the unselected ballot is AES-encrypted, an HMAC generated and the whole thing
submitted to the server, identified by the aforementioned handle:
// TODO: Generate a SK rather than using a static one. UUID generated
server side and then injected JS side?
JSON.stringify(otherBallot)
var SK = "temporary";
var encAlt = sjcl.encrypt(SK, JSON.stringify(otherBallot));
var out = (new sjcl.misc.hmac(key, sjcl.hash.sha256)).mac(encAlt);
var hmac = sjcl.codec.hex.fromBits(out);
let selectedBallotAsStr = JSON.stringify(selectedBallot);
$.ajax({
29
Chapter 5 Section 5.1
type : "POST",
url : window.location,
data : { handle: ballotID, encBallot: encAlt, ballot:





Following this, the onAfterBallotSend() method was modified to present the handle of
the unselected ballot, in both text and QR form:
// Add the second section: QR code that contains the ballot identifier
and HMAC




SK is also displayed:
let SKContainerDiv = document.createElement('div');
SKContainerDiv.setAttribute("class", "containerMarginTop");
let SKDiv = document.createElement('div');
SKDiv.setAttribute("class", "skDIV");





5.1.3 ‘Find Ballot’ page
This page allows a user to check whether the election server contains a ballot whose hash
matches one of the two saved by the voter during the voting process.
/allauthdemo/polls/views.py
A method was added to the Django view controller that takes ballot identification details and
two hashes, delimited with a semicolon, as URL parameters:
def find_ballot(request):
voter_id = request.GET.get('vid', None)
poll_id = request.GET.get('pid', None)
ballot = get_object_or_404(Ballot, voter=voter_id, poll=poll_id)
hash1 = request.GET.get('hash1', None)
hash2 = request.GET.get('hash2', None)
if not ballot.cast:
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This Django template renders the ballot and hashes in hidden elements:
{% extends "bases/bootstrap-with-nav.html" %}
{% load staticfiles %}
{% load bootstrap3 %}
{% block content %}
<pre hidden id="ballot_found">{{ ballot }}</pre>




The client-side Javascript compares the ballot hash with both of the provided hashes:




var hashes = $('#ballot_hashes').text().split(';');
$('#ballot_result').text("Ballot not found!");
for (var i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {





5.1.4 ‘Audit Ballot’ page
This page was intended to allow a voter or a third-party auditor to compare two ballots for
equality.
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/allauthdemo/polls/views.py
A vote_audit() method was added to the view controller which takes two encrypted bal-
lot handles passed as URL parameters and attempts to retrieve them from the MySQL
database:
def vote_audit(request):
handle1 = request.GET.get('handle1', None)
















This template produced the page containing any ballots requested and retrieved from the
MySQL database:
{% extends "bases/bootstrap-with-nav.html" %}
{% load staticfiles %}
{% load bootstrap3 %}
{% block content %}
<label class="gp-1" for="handle1">Ballot #1 handle:</label>
<input class="gp-1" id="handle1" value="{{ handle1 }}" type="text"/>
<label class="gp-1" for="handle2">Ballot handle:</label>
<input class="gp-1" id="handle2" value="{{ handle2 }}" type="text"/>
<button class="gp-1" id="retrieve-ballots">Retrieve Ballots</button>
<hr>
<label class="gp-2" for="ballot1">AES-encrypted ballot #1 from
server</label>
<pre class="gp-2" id="ballot1">{{ ballot }}</pre>
<input class="gp-2" id="SK1" value="temporary" type="text"/>
<button class="gp-2" id="decrypt-ballot1">Decrypt Ballot</button>
<label class="gp-3" for="ballot-content1">Decrypted ballot</label>
<pre class="gp-3" id="ballot-content1"></pre>
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<label class="gp-3" for="ballot-result1">Ballot encoding</label>
<pre class="gp-3" id="ballot-result1"></pre>
<hr>
<label class="gp-2" for="ballot2">AES-encrypted ballot #2 from
server</label>
<pre class="gp-2" id="ballot2">{{ ballot2 }}</pre>
<input class="gp-2" id="SK2" value="temporary" type="text"/>
<button class="gp-2" id="decrypt-ballot2">Decrypt Ballot</button>
<label class="gp-3" for="ballot-content2">Decrypted ballot</label>
<pre class="gp-3" id="ballot-content2"></pre>




If the page is requested without two ballot handles, the option to enter them is displayed.
Otherwise, both ballots are displayed and the option to enter an SK for each is offered:
$( document ).ready(function() {
$('.gp-2, .gp-3').hide();
var n = 0;
for (var i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {










If two handles have not been passed to the page, handles can be submitted by the user.





With two ballots loaded and the SKs of each inputted, they can be decrypted in order to
determine which candidate they contain a vote or votes for. This code does not work, but
the intention was to compute whether C2 ÷C1r equals g0 or g1, with the exponent m being a
1 for a cast vote or a 0 otherwise:
$('#begin-test').click(function() {
var ctx = new CTX("BN254CX");
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r: null
}
var ballot = JSON.parse(sjcl.decrypt($('#SK').val(),
$('#ballot').text()));
var votes = ballot['encryptedVotes'];
$('#ballot-content').text(JSON.stringify(votes));
var voteNum = 0, optionNum = 0;
// For each encrypted vote within the ballot...
votes.forEach(function(vote) {
voteNum++;
$('#ballot-result').text($('#ballot-result').text() + "Vote " +
voteNum + ": \n ");
// For each encrypted fragment within the vote (i.e. the encoded
vote for one option)...
vote['fragments'].forEach(function(fragment) {
optionNum++;
$('#ballot-result').text($('#ballot-result').text() + "Option " +
optionNum + ": \n ");
var encoding = "";
var C1Bytes = getBytes(fragment['C1'].split(","));
var C2Bytes = getBytes(fragment['C2'].split(","));
var rBytes = getBytes(fragment['r'].split(","));
ciphertext.C1 = new ctx.ECP.fromBytes(C1Bytes);
ciphertext.C2 = new ctx.ECP.fromBytes(C2Bytes);
ciphertext.r = new ctx.BIG.fromBytes(rBytes);
// For each pair of C1,C2 values (i.e. one ballot's ciphertext)
and the randomness used in its encryption r,
// test whether C2/(C1)^r = g^0 or g^1, and record g's exponent.
//var c1 = ctx.PAIR.GTpow(ciphertext.C1, ciphertext.r);
var B;
var j;
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
//use D as temp var








encoding += (m) ? "1" : "0";
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// Somehow, this string of 1s and 0s here needs to become _one_ 1
or 0 to signify whether the option was
// voted for or not.










The app. manifest declares the package to be uk.ac.lancaster.auditor and demands the








































The app. has the following dependencies:
dependencies {











The main menu uses a ConstraintLayout and places two buttons on the screen—one for












































class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {















The QR code-scanning vote recording Activity is based on Daniell Algar’s BarcodeReader-
Sample code, which is released under an MIT license [4].
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/res/layout/activity_barcode_scan.xml
The barcode scanner layout file is unchanged from the original, presenting a Button to begin
scanning and a TextView to show the scanned text.
/java/.../barcode/BarcodeScanActivity.kt
Added to the start of the Activity is the structure that will be used to create the LBRF:
private lateinit var mResultTextView: TextView
private var stage = 0
data class Record(val recordID: Int) {
var voterID: String = ""
var eventID: String = ""
var pollID: String = ""
var hashes: String = ""
var handle: String = ""
var hmac: String = ""
}
private val record = Record(0)
The onActivityResult() method is modified to save the relevant scanned data in the
Record object as each code is scanned:
// Store the relevant info from whatever this QR code is for
when (stage) {
// Stage 0 is getting the voter ID, poll ID and event ID
0 -> {
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The saveRecord() method produces a file in the mobile phone’s internal memory contain-
ing the LBRF:
private fun saveRecord() {
// save the ballot
val filename = record.handle
val fileContents = record.toString()
val outputStream: FileOutputStream
try {
outputStream = openFileOutput(filename, Context.MODE_PRIVATE)
outputStream.write(fileContents.toByteArray())
outputStream.close()







This chapter shall demonstrate the process by which a user interacts with the system.
6.1 Voting
When voting, the voter follows the unique link emailed to them to the voting page for the ap-
propriate election event. They indicate their preference(s) as shown in fig. 6.1, then click the
‘Begin Voting’ button to generate the resulting ballots (fig. 6.2). The first QR code displayed
(fig. 6.3) contains the voter ID, event ID and poll ID. The second (fig. 6.4) contains the hashes
of both ballot copies. The voter is then prompted to choose one of the ballot copies to sub-
mit to the server (fig. 6.5). Before this ballot is sent, a confirmation window is shown which
allows the voter to audit that their vote has been recorded-as-intended (fig. 6.6). Finally, the
selected ballot is submitted to the server, the unselected ballot is AES-encrypted with SK
and sent to the server and a third QR code is displayed alongside SK which contains the
unique handle for the encrypted ballot on the server (fig. 6.7).
6.2 Auditing
On the main menu, the user can choose whether they are casting a vote or auditing an elec-
tion (fig. 6.8). Choosing the former option, they are shown the QR reader screen (fig. 6.9).
For each QR code displayed on the web app., they scan with their mobile device camera
(figs 6.10, 6.12 & 6.14) and the results are shown on-screen (figs 6.11, 6.13 & 6.15). At the
end, the complete LBRF is saved to the devices internal memory.
40
Chapter 6 Section 6.2
Figure 6.1: Recording a vote
Figure 6.2: Generating ballots
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Figure 6.3: QR code 1/3: IDs
Figure 6.4: QR code 2/3: Ballot hashes
Figure 6.5: Choosing a ballot to submit
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Figure 6.6: Ballot confirmation
Figure 6.7: QR code 3/3: Encrypted ballot handle
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Figure 6.8: App. main menu
Figure 6.9: ‘Casting a vote’ screen
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Figure 6.10: Recording QR code 1/3
Figure 6.11: QR code 1/3 result
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Figure 6.12: Recording QR code 2/3
Figure 6.13: QR code 2/3 result
46
Chapter 6 Section 6.2
Figure 6.14: Recording QR code 3/3




Unfortunately, this project did not succeed in producing a fully-functioning implementation
of the designed app. in the time alloted. As such, this chapter shall instead feature an
overview of the tests that would have been implemented in order to test that the system was
functioning correctly, had it been completed.
7.1 Is DẼMOS 2 E2E-auditable?
DẼMOS 2 has been proven to be E2E-verifiable, but without the means by which to do so
this means little. Any proposed means (such as a mobile device app.) must be able to do
the following;
7.1.1 Verify recorded-as-intended
The voter must be able to ensure that the system has recorded their vote as having been
for the candidate(s) that they intended. Clearly, only they are able to do so. This has been
implemented in the confirmatory window which is displayed during the ballot casting process,
which shows them the recorded vote(s) and allows them to approve or reject them.
7.1.2 Verify cast-as-recorded
The part of the process in which the recorded vote(s) are turned into a ballot is one in
which a malicious actor could attempt to interfere with the process. Therefore, the second
property that must be verifiable is that a ballot represents a vote for the candidate(s) the voter
recorded votes for. This can be done by allowing them to specify their choice(s), decrypting
the ballot and determining whether the vote(s) align.
7.1.3 Verify counted-as-cast
The final election result must be auditable to ensure that all ballots have been counted, and
that all ballots have been counted correctly. One way of doing so may be to allow all ballots
to be downloaded by the auditor, who can then decrypt them and tally the result themselves.
7.1.4 Maintain ballot secrecy
As the previous two solutions both involve ballot decryption, means must be implemented
to make sure that a malicious actor cannot identify a voter’s ballot and choice(s), and that a
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voter may not share with another party who their vote was for in order to deter vote selling or
coercing. However, the fact that a voter can change their vote as many times as they wish
may render the second issue moot, as nobody would buy votes that could easily be changed
after proof was received.
7.2 Validation
Validation is necessary at many stages of the process, and must be robustly tested with
edge cases to detect both errors and malicious tampering.
7.2.1 Cast equals recorded
After showing the voter the confirmation window containing their recorded vote, it must be
tested whether malicious client-side Javascript can change the recorded vote in time for
ballot generation.
7.2.2 Detect encrypted ballot tampering
An HMAC must be computed on any received encrypted ballots and compared with that
stored within the app. in order to detect if any element of the ballot has been tampered with
on the server.
7.2.3 Detect missing ballots
The hashes of both generated ballots must be tested to ensure that one of them (and only




Unfortunately, this project experienced limited success, failing to produce a fully-functioning
mobile app. that could be used to verify the three properties of E2E-verifiability. In this chap-
ter, the progress that was made is assessed in relation to the original stated requirements.
Then, the project as a whole is dicussed and the lessons learned from its failure detailed.
After this, suggestions for further development are made, being largely those features that
were not successfully implemented here. Finally, we end on a positive note by examining
the succeses of the project, such as they are.
8.1 Review of aims & requirements
We recall here the aims outlined in § 1.2:
• to add functionality to DẼMOS 2 to allow a voter to check that their vote has been
recorded-as-intended;
• to through adding functionality to DẼMOS 2 and the development of a separate Android
mobile application, allow a voter (or a third party to whom they have delegated the task)
to verify that their ballot has been cast-as-recorded;
• to as before, allow a voter or third party to verify that the final calculated result of a
given election has counted-as-cast all given ballots;
• to ensure that these three features are implemented in such a way that ensures a
voter’s privacy is protected;
• to ensure that these three features are implemented in such as way as to deter voter
coercion, vote buying and vote selling; and
• to document the ways in which which these features are implemented so that future
developers are able to easily develop their own independent election auditing tools.
Aim 8.1 was successfully achieved, and some progress was made towards aim 8.1. Un-
fortunately, however, the functionality was not implemented successfully, which in turn led
to aim 8.1 not even being started. As a result, there was no opportunity presented to fulfil
aims 8.1 & 8.1. Finally, aim8.1 was achieved for the functionality that was successfully im-
plemented, with suggestions on how such future developers may continue the work begun
here to be presented in a subsequent section.
We also recall here the requirements outlined in § 4.1:
50
Chapter 8 Section 8.2
8.1.1 DẼMOS 2 Requirements
Modifications to the existing DẼMOS 2 system must be made so that:
1. voters MUST be presented with confirmation of their recorded vote in order to allow for
recorded-as-intended verification;
2. voters MUST be presented with a secure copy of their ballot in a format that can be
easily transferred to another device (such as a mobile smartphone);
3. options MUST be provided for the format of this data transfer in order to ensure that all
voters are able to transfer it regardless of the technology they possess;
4. voting information MUST NOT pass unencrypted to the server at any point;
5. voters MUST be able to check that their ballot exists on the server;
6. voters and third parties MUST be presented with a means of auditing ballots held on
the server in order to allow for both cast-as-recorded and tallied-as-cast verification;
and
7. voters and third parties MUST NOT be able to discern which option(s) a ballot contains
a vote for.
8.1.2 App. Requirements
The application must be designed in such a way that:
1. voters MUST be able to receive data presented by the DẼMOS 2 system using their
mobile phone;
2. voters MUST be able to store secure copies of their ballots locally;
3. voters MUST be able to transfer their secure ballot copies to third parties;
4. voters and third parties MUST be able to compare their secure ballot copies with the
ballot copies stored on the server; and
5. voters and third parties MUST NOT be able to discern which option(s) a ballot contains
a vote for.
We shall begin with the DẼMOS 2 requirements, wherein much of the successes of the
project lie. Req. 1 was achieved, as was req. 2 (via the LBRFs). Req. 3 was also achieved by
adding text displays alongside QR codes, ensuring that all voters would be able to transfer
the data they needed for auditing without the need for a smartphone camera.
Req. 4 was adhered to throughout, and req. 5 almost implemented. Req. 6 was designed
but not implemented, which meant the circumstances that would have required req. 7 were
never present.
Moving on to the app. requirements, req. 1 was achieved via the use of QR codes, but
no option was implemented for those without the ability to read them. All other requirements
were not implemented.
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8.2 Review of project
This project was one part of a one-year, full-time Master’s course. Ultimately, the project has
not been successful and has failed to produce the planned, fully-functioning software. What
has been produced is a version of D EMOS 2 modified such that it should be possible for a
future developer to produce the planned app. with minimal further changes, as well as the
basis of such an app. with which they could begin their project. In this section, the course
of the project shall be reviewed and the reasons for its failure—predominantly a consistent
lack of focus and motivation on the part of myself—identified.
The project began promisingly. Myself and my supervisor had developed a strong plan
in which I would learn about Android app. development and Django over the first term of
the Master’s course during which other modules were to take priority. This would ensure
that I would be able to dive straight into development once the majority of the course had
been completed. Unfortunately, deferring the start of the project proper to so far in the future
proved to be a bad idea, leading to a very slow start. In addition, for the initial few months
of of the second term I remained uncertain as to the project’s goal, having believed that the
purpose of the app. was to provide a side channel by which a voter could verify their ballot
having been cast independently of the device used to cast it, if they believed that the device
may have been untrustworthy—i.e., a public library computer.
Ultimately, work on the project did not start in earnest until the end of the course’s sec-
ond term, leaving only a few months for its completion. From this inauspicious beginning,
the project never truly recovered. In addition, whilst the completion of the last remaining
non-dissertation module should have provided the ideal opportunity for me to devote my full
attention to the project, I shortly thereafter began full-time employment, further sapping both
the motivation to complete the project and the time available to do so.
High-stakes, but ultimately successful, last-minute project completions are nothing new
to me, having been my preferred work style during both my undergraduate and postgrad-
uate study. For this project, however, there was a crucial obstacle to overcome—a lack of
motivation, borne of the belief that the project as a whole represented not just a field that
was not beneficial for democracy, but may in fact be actively detrimental. I fully accept the
responsibility for not having raised these issues at an earlier juncture, perhaps soon enough
to change project, and I shall here detail my objections to both e-voting and I-voting.













Through E2E auditing, any voter or in-
terested third party so delegated can
verify an election result to be fair
The number of people able to actually understand the verification, and there-
fore to trust it, is miniscule. In addition, various checks and balances in
traditional voting systems produce a system that is almost as secure, allow
anyone to register to observe the count (or to delegate this responsibility to
trusted parties) whilst also being mechanically comprehensible to all.
Reduces cost DRE voting entails less cost than the
use of masses of paper ballots—the
UK could apparently stand to save
£12.8 million annually [105]
Those savings assume a shift to a completely e-voting system, with no con-
current paper system for auditing purposes. In addition, Australia found the
cost to be $1,159 per I-voter, compared to $8.86 per traditional voter [49].
Increases
turnout
By making voting more convenient,
DRE voting will counter long-term de-
creasing trends in voter turnout, par-
ticularly amongst youth demographics
more familiar with live lived through a
smartphone—in the UK by as much
as 70–79% [105].
Finland found no significant increase in turnout [33]. Other research has
concurred with this [13, 109], with one study even finding the greatest in-
crease to have been amongst middle-aged voters.
Protects against
corruption
Through the use of cryptography, cor-
rupt election officials can no longer
interfere with the running of an
election—you can’t argue with math.
DRE voting requires that one choose the make and model of system to use,
or to make their own. With only a tiny proportion of the electorate able to
understand the differences, DRE voting serves to empower corrupt officials
to choose known-vulnerable systems or to introduce their own backdoors.
Paper-based elections are performed in much the same, vendor-neutral way




As voting can be done remotely, this
enables those who cannot make it
to a polling station—e.g., the dis-
abled, military personnel overseas,
astronauts—to vote.
This can similarly be achieved for most such voters via postal ballots, and
the selective introduction of I-voting if need be for tiny, easily verifiable
groups such as in-orbit astronauts.
Table 8.1: An overview of the proposed advantages of DRE voting systems in light of real-world experiences
53
Chapter 8 Section 8.2
As mentioned in § 2.6, ‘e-voting’ may refer to either a paper-based e-voting system or a
DRE voting system. The former category includes voting systems in which only some minor
role is played by electronic means, such as marking and counting paper ballots—with the
possible advent of self-driving cars in the near future, this could also include the transporta-
tion of ballots from polling station to official count in driverless vans. These paper-based
e-voting systems are, by and large, benign, although the use of automated ballot marking
and counting devices must be paired with a robust means of detecting errors or tampering
in either, such as a miscounting machine or an unmarked ballot.
DRE voting systems, on the other hand, are fraught with peril. During the research un-
dertaken for § 2.8, it became clear that almost every country that had experimented with
DRE voting systems had run into trouble. Documented issues abound with specific (and
nonetheless popular) makes of DRE voting systems [41, 36, 67, 32, 44, 7, 80, 61, 79, 57,
110, 86, 73, 94, 70, 96]. I-voting fares even worse, with most pilot schemes having been
cancelled shortly following their introduction [99, 49, 33] citing reasons of prohibitive cost or
insecurity. Only three countries have continued to run I-voting systems for any considerable
length of time, and Switzerland and (most of) the United States offer I-voting only to over-
seas and in-orbit citizens.
This leaves only Estonia flying the flag for I-voting. Estonia, however, is not like many
other countries—through it’s e-Estonia project it has produced a highly networked nation, in
which—and, crucially, unlike in the United Kingdom and United States—each citizen pos-
sesses a unique and mandatory ID card used for elections, amongst other things. These ID
cards give the Estonians a great advantage when attempting to implement I-voting, allowing
them to easily authenticate eligible voters and making it harder to cast fraudulant ballots.
The level of resistance to the introduction of governmental ID cards in both the UK and the
US, however, is as high as it is consistent. Without these, the prospects of successfully intro-
ducting nationwide I-voting in either of these countries—the primary foci of this project—are
low. Even these ID cards, however, have not been without issue [78].
Implementations may be vulnerable, but the most damning problems with DRE voting
systems are fundamental [8]—as table 8.1 lays out. Though traditional paper elections may
not be cryptographically secure, they are for all intents and purposes practically secure.
There is no way to interfere noticably with the outcome except with large-scale ballot theft,
stuffing or coercion efforts, and if men with guns are stood at the polling station telling you
how you have to vote, whether the result is auditable or not is the least of your concerns.
Whilst comparing ballot totals across different stages of the tallying, allowing neutral ob-
servers to oversee the count and offering candidates the right to request a recount if they
believe the count to have been unfair are not perfect measures of security, they are certainly
good enough.
This leads into the most important trade-off with traditional vs DRE voting: an election
‘...must not only be fair, but also be seen to be fair[, w]ithout a BSc.’ [97] The presence of
trust in the electoral system is as vital as that of the electors themselves, and within tradi-
tional voting this trust is maintained by virtue of the fact that, even if they are not personally
present at the count, the average voter has no problem understanding how the process of
recording, collecting and counting paper ballots works, as well as the fact that a range of
people from all walks of life—members of all parties and neutral observers—are present,
overseeing the count.
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Contrast this with DRE voting systems, which rely on complex cryptography to produce
a higher level of security at the cost of drastically limiting who can understand the system.
Unless the introduction of glsdre voting is accompanied with a scheme to teach the entire
electorate the basic tenets of cryptography and zero-knowledge proofs, they will not under-
stand and may consequently lose trust in the system. Though experts may be trusted to
verify election integrity, as count observers are currently entrusted to oversee paper count-
ing, the number of cryptographic experts is far smaller than the number of people with func-
tioning eyes. As such, what to do if party x has no supporters with the requistite technical
knowledge? Are they to trust party y’s experts?
As such, the introduction of DRE voting systems turns the electoral process into an in-
penetrable black box to the vast majority of the electorate. Eroding trust is one issue with
this; a more pernicious one emerges when one considers that one potential adversary in an
election setting is that of a malicious election authority. DRE voting systems accept this risk,
and propose as a result that voters should be able to audit that an election has been con-
ducted fairly. However, when one has no understanding of their internal workings, one black
box appears much the same as any other. Consider a malicious election authority producing
their own ‘auditing’ app. that does nothing of the sort—who would know? Experts, no doubt,
but their warnings regarding commonly-used DRE voting machines (such as DieBold) have
thusfar gone largely unheeded, so why should this situation be different?
The theoretical corrupt election authority is further emboldened by the fact that the intro-
duction of a DRE voting system necessarily means the introduction of a specific DRE voting
system. It requires the decision to use consumer product x rather than consumer product y,
rather than a vendor-neutral method of counting marked objects using one’s eyeballs. Not
only does this mean that each system must have its security verified separately, but it could
also allow the supposed corrupt election authority to intentionally choose to implement a
DRE voting system known to be vulnerable, or even to produce one itself with intentional
backdoors. One cannot design a backdoor into a system that relies on people sorting paper
ballots into piles.
So, DRE voting systems appear to be both harmful to the trust on which democracy re-
lies in the name of security, whilst simulteneously enabling corrupt election officials to better
interfere with the running of their elections. Additional proposed benefits are those of cost
reduction and increased voter turnout, neither of which appear to be supported by the ex-
periences of those countries that have thusfar run pilots [99, 49, 33]. The sole remaining
argument in favour of DRE voting is that it allows voters who are otherwise unable to attend
a polling station—the disabled, the expatriate, the military, the astronaut—to nonetheless
exercise their democratic rights. However, almost all of these voters’ needs can be similarly
served by the introduction of a postal ballot.
This leaves only those voters currently in orbit—all six of them [107]. Even expanding this
to include voters under the sea or in the middle of a desert, the number is miniscule, and the
benefit of ensuring them a vote must be weighed against the detriment of undermining the
entire electoral system. Even if the decision is made that ensuring their ability to vote must
be paramount, there is no argument for extending such an option to all voters. As Texas has
shown, astronauts can be granted a unique allowance to vote by email—the tiny number of
them should serve to both make tampering with their votes easily detectable and woefully
unproductive for the attacker.
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In conclusion, then, I concur with the National Academies of Science who wrote in their
2018 report on e-voting that ‘[q]lections should be conducted with human-readable paper
ballots [which] may be marked by hand or by machine (using a ballot-marking device) [and]
may be counted by hand or by machine (using an optical scanner)’, but no more [69].
8.3 Suggestions for further development
Despite all of these reservations regarding the benefits of DRE voting systems, others are
of course welcome to work on them if they disagree. In this section, therefore, suggestions
shall be made for how a future developer may build on the work begun here to create the
DẼMOS 2 auditing app. that was originally intended.
8.3.1 Add cast-as-recorded functionality
Currently, the recorded-as-intended functionality shows the voter the option they have recorded
a vote for and asks them to confirm it as correct before generating any ballots. However, if
the voter was using the system on a malicious device that injected Javascript into the page,
it would be possible to change the value of the recorded vote after the voter has confirmed
it, in time to generate the ballots. This necessitates the development of cast-as-recorded
auditing functionality, as detailed in the Design chapter.
8.3.2 Add counted-as-cast functionality
Currently, no start has been made on the implementation of counted-as-cast functionality,
the third element of E2E verifiability.
8.3.3 Introduce validation to QR codes
Currently, there is no validation embedded in the QR codes. This means that whilst the user
must scan three QR codes for each section of the LBRF, there is no way of detecting if they
have accidentally scanned the wrong one for the current step (e.g., scanning the ballot hash
QR code when the app expects the encrypted ballot handle code). This should be added.
8.3.4 Extend browser support for DẼMOS 2
Currently, the qrcode.js library [89] is used to generate all QR codes. Despite its claims to
be a ‘[c]ross-browser QRCode generator’, the QR codes do not appear to display on non-
Firefox Web browsers. This is obviously an obstacle to the widespread support of DẼMOS
2 and should be resolved, through the use of a different QR code library if need be.
8.3.5 Redirect the user to the app. main menu after scanning all QR
codes
After scanning the third and final QR code, the user should be directed back to the main
menu.
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8.3.6 Save LBRFs to external memory
Android uses the terms ‘internal memory’ to refer to files that are accessible only by the app.
that has created them and ‘external memory’ to refer to files that are accessible by other
apps, such as file browsers. Currently, LBRFs are saved to the former, but if the intention is
to enable them to be passed between interested parties for auditing purposes, this should
be changed.
8.4 In closing
In closing, this project has been unsuccessful, but not unproductive. From it I have gained
experience in both the Django Web framework and Android app. development, including
in the Kotlin language, where previously I had none in either. I have also had a chance
to work on software simulteneously with another, becoming more familiar with Git version
control in the process. Through the typesetting of this dissertation I have broadened my
understanding of LATEX. Moreover, I have become intimately familiar with the pros and cons
of e-voting, which has in turn shifted my opinion on such systems from a cautiously positive
one to an overwhelmingly negative one.
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